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1 
ARTICLES 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF “BELT AND ROAD” INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT DISPUTES SETTLEMENT INSTITUTION* 
Yang Lu** 
ABSTRACT 
In the context of the growth of regional international investment 
disputes (IIDs) caused by the Belt and Road (B&R) initiative, having a third-
party settlement will play an important role in IIDs. Currently, the B&R 
countries have mostly selected the International Center for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) as the IIDs settlement institution in their 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), which requires cases where a B&R 
country is respondent to be handled by nationals of countries outside the 
B&R area. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a B&R IIDs Settlement 
Institution for the purpose of optimizing the current situation of IIDs 
settlement in the B&R region, dealing with the constantly-increasing regional 
IIDs, better protecting geographical investments, and facilitating China to 
participate in and further guide the reconstruction of international investment 
regulations. Moreover, the feasibilities in law, platform and resources for its 
establishment have been available. With respect to the path option, we should 
take the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank as a platform to draft a 
convention, take the ICSID Convention as a reference for structure and 
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system innovation, and devote great efforts to driving B&R countries to 
conclude the convention. 
Keywords: Belt and Road, Investment Disputes Settlement, ICSID, 
Bilateral Investment Treaty. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Central Asia and Southeast 
Asia in September and October of 2013, he raised the initiative of jointly 
building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk 
Road (hereinafter “the Belt and Road” or “B&R”), which have attracted close 
attention from all over the world.1 The Belt and Road Initiative gives new 
meanings to the ancient Silk Road. It draws a beautiful blueprint for China’s 
deepening reform and opening-up policy as well as China’s full participation 
in global governance. It brings new vitality into the Asia-Europe regional 
cooperation, and also provides a new path for global prosperity and 
development.2 With the progress and implementation of this initiative, there 
will be a tremendous growth of foreign direct investment (hereinafter “FDI”) 
in the B&R area. Additionally, due to many B&R developing countries’ 
urgent demands for improving their poor infrastructures through FDIs, China 
will more play an investor’s role in this region.3 International Investment 
Disputes (hereinafter “IID”) always come after international investment. 
Moreover, safety problems usually happen in the B&R area. Endless 
traditional and non-traditional security threats caused by ethnic, religious and 
territorial disputes, resource conflicts, drugs and organized crime, together 
with low trust among countries,4 constitute potential catalysts for IIDs. 
IIDs, in the broadest sense, include the following disputes incurred in 
FDIs: (1) disputes between a foreign private investor and a host government 
(or its agency) and (2) disputes between a foreign private investor and an 
                                                                                                                           
 
1 See THE NAT’L DEV. AND REFORM COMM’N, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND MINISTRY OF 
COMMERCE OF CHINA (WITH STATE COUNCIL AUTHORIZATION), Vision and Actions on Jointly Building 
Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, http://zhs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/xxfb/ 
201503/20150300926644.shtml (last visited June 12, 2017). 
2 See Xintao Yuan, Analysis of the National Strategic “One Belt One Road” Construction, 2014 
AROUND SOUTHEAST ASIA, 3, 3 (No. 8). 
3 In 2015 and 2016, Chinese enterprises made direct investments in 49 and 53 countries along the 
Belt and Road, with a total investment of 14.82 billion U.S. dollars (up 18.2% on a year-on-year basis) 
and 14.53 billion U.S. dollars (down 2% on a year-on-year basis) respectively. See Economic and Trade 
Cooperation between China and “Belt and Road” Related Countries in 2015, http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/ 
article/fwydyl/tjsj/201601/20160101239838.shtml (last visited June 12, 2017), and Economic and Trade 
Cooperation between China and “Belt and Road” Related Countries in 2016, http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/ 
article/fwydyl/tjsj/201701/20170102504239.shtml (last visited June 12, 2017). 
4 See Haiyun Wang et al., The Background, Potential Challenges and Future Trends of the “Silk 
Road Economic Belt,” 2014 RUSSIAN CENTRAL ASIAN & EAST EUROPEAN MARKET, 5, 9 (No. 4). 
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enterprise or individual of the host country.5 However, since the latter is not 
different from ordinary international commercial disputes, the so-called IIDs 
generally mean the former.6 This Article will only focus on resolutions to the 
former kind of disputes.7 Considering the uniqueness of IIDs between a 
foreign private investor and a host government (or its agency), it can be said 
that seeking settlement by a third-party dispute settlement institution 
(hereinafter “third-party institution”), which is independent from the host 
country and the investor’s home country, is the most effective and widely 
accepted method among many other solutions, such as consultation and 
conciliation, host state relief, home state diplomatic protection, foreign court 
litigation and international investment arbitration.8 In the context of the 
growth of IIDs brought by the Belt and Road initiative, it is foreseeable that 
IIDs settlement by third-party institutions will be widely used in the region 
and will play an important role in resolving intra-regional IIDs. 
Compared to international commercial arbitration, the major difference 
of IID settlements is the exclusiveness of third-party institutions. Only a few 
special permanent institutions have states’ waiver of jurisdictional immunity 
in some particular foreign private investment disputes to carry out settlement 
procedures, while the number of commercial dispute settlement institutions 
is large.9 Therefore, in order to promote FDIs among countries along the Belt 
and Road (hereinafter “B&R countries”) and properly handle the resultant 
IIDs, is it necessary and possible to establish a special institution located in 
                                                                                                                           
 
5 See JINSONG YU, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 343 (2014). 
6 See Guiguo Wang, Dispute Settlement Mechanism of “Belt and Road” Strategy, 2016 CHINA L. 
REV., 33, 35 (No. 2). 
7 As used herein, an international investment dispute or international investment arbitration refers 
only to a dispute between the investor and the host country arising from FDIs or an arbitration arising out 
of this dispute. 
8 Some scholars believed that investment treaties allowing investors to choose between host state 
relief and international arbitration have actually made international arbitration nearly the only way to 
resolve IIDs. See, e.g., Sun Liu, The Challenges of International Investment Arbitration to State 
Sovereignty: A Comment on the Response of the United States and Its Enlightenment, 2008 STUDIES IN 
LAW & BUSINESS, 3, 4 (No. 3). 
9 According to the statistics of UNCTAD, so far, the only third-party institutions that have actually 
accepted IIDs are the Cairo Regional Center for International Commercial Arbitration, the International 
Chamber of Commerce, the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes, the London Court 
of International Arbitration, the Moscow Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration, the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. See INVESTMENT POLICY HUB, http://investment 
policyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByRulesAndInstitution (last visited June 12, 2017). 
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the B&R region and committed to settling intra-regional IIDs (hereinafter 
“Belt and Road/B&R IIDs Settlement Institution”)? If yes, how would it be 
established? This Article will study these questions based on empirical 
investigations. 
I. EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS ON B&R COUNTRIES ACCEPTING THIRD-
PARTY INSTITUTIONS’ IIDS SETTLEMENT 
Conditioned upon a host country’s waiver of jurisdictional immunity, 
third-party institutions must obtain host countries’ consent to deal with IIDs. 
So far, in addition to traditional investment contracts as a form of consent, 
international investment treaties [including Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(BITs) and Multilateral Investment Treaties (MITs)] between investors’ 
home countries and the host country, and relevant provisions of the host 
country’s domestic law, have been important forms.10 Among these, 
international investment treaties are especially significant. By December 31, 
2016, 3,324 international investment treaties had been reached all over the 
world, including 2,957 BITs and 367 MITs.11 Given that BITs are more 
commonly demonstrated by their quantity, this Article will consider the BITs 
concluded by the B&R countries to examine their selection of third-party 
institutions. 
A. Selection Preference of Third-Party Institutions in BITs Concluded by 
B&R Countries 
The Belt and Road comprises of two regions, and although it is not a 
closed system that does not have absolute boundaries and spatial scope,12 it 
is generally believed that it mainly covers or radiates to more than 60 
countries, most of which are developing countries, on three continents—
Asia, Europe and Africa. This empirical study will focus on these B&R 
countries. 
                                                                                                                           
 
10 See LUCY REED, JAN PAULSSON & NIGEL BLACKABY, GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 13 (2d ed. 
2010). 
11 See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2017—Investment 
and the Digital Economy, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2017, 111 (2017). 
12 See Weidong Liu, Scientific Understanding of the Belt and Road Initiative of China and Related 
Research Themes, 2015 PROGRESS IN GEOGRAPHY 538, 541 (No. 5). 
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1. Selection for International Center for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) 
According to the data provided by the ICSID official website,13 among 
the BITs signed by 66 B&R countries, the status for selection of ICSID as a 
third-party institution is as follows: 
Status of Selecting ICSID in BITs Signed by 66 B&R Countries 
 
 
State 
 
Total 
Number 
of BITs 
 
Number 
of BITs 
Choosing 
ICSID 
 
 
Percentage 
 
 
State 
 
Total 
Number 
of BITs 
 
Number 
of BITs 
Choosing 
ICSID 
 
 
Percentage 
China 128 93 72.7% Mongolia 37 32 86.5% 
Singapore 42 36 85.7% Malaysia 68 49 72.1% 
Indonesia 59 44 74.6% Myanmar 7 4 57.1% 
Thailand 44 30 68.2% Laos 26 15 57.7% 
Cambodia 19 14 73.7% Vietnam 53 28 52.8% 
Brunei 4 3 75% Philippines 36 28 77.8% 
Iran 61 22 36.1% Iraq 3 2 66.7% 
Turkey 93 74 80% Syria 31 14 45.2% 
Jordan 56 31 55.4% Lebanon 53 44 83% 
Israel 45 39 86.7% Palestine 0 0 - 
Saudi Arabia 23 14 60.9% Yemen 35 21 60% 
Oman 32 19 59.3% United Arab 
Emirates 
43 39 90.7% 
Qatar 35 20 57.1% Kuwait 63 38 60.3% 
Bahrain 31 24 77.4% Greece 44 32 72.7% 
Cyprus 25 14 56% Egypt 109 65 59.6% 
India 85 73 85.9% Pakistan 52 34 65.4% 
Bangladesh 31 25 80.6% Afghanistan 3 2 66.7% 
Sri Lanka 28 24 85.7% Maldives 0 0 - 
Nepal 6 6 100% Bhutan 0 0 - 
Kazakhstan 42 28 66.7% Uzbekistan 45 27 60% 
Turkmenistan 22 13 59.1% Tajikistan 25 10 40% 
Kyrgyzstan 25 13 52% Russia 64 13 20.3% 
Ukraine 70 34 48.6% Belarus 62 22 35.5% 
Georgia 32 17 53.1% Azerbaijan 44 18 40.9% 
Armenia 39 17 43.6% Moldova 43 22 51.2% 
Poland 68 54 79.4% Lithuania 53 49 92.5% 
Estonia 32 24 75% Latvia 48 34 70.8% 
Czech 113 82 72.6% Slovakia 58 34 58.6% 
Hungary 60 53 88.3% Slovenia 42 23 54.8% 
Croatia 66 44 66.7% Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
36 20 55.6% 
Montenegro 21 10 47.6% Serbia 50 24 48% 
Albania 39 27 69.2% Romania 103 66 64.1% 
Bulgaria 64 28 43.8% Macedonia 34 27 79.4% 
                                                                                                                           
 
13 See Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, Database of Bilateral Investment Treaties, ICSID, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/resources/Bilateral-Investment-Treaties-Database.aspx#a14 (last 
visited June 12, 2017). 
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The statistics in the above table state: 
(1) 63 out of 66 countries signed at least one BIT to choose ICSID as a 
third-party institution, which means 95.45% of these countries do so. 
(2) Considering all the BITs, the number of countries with over one-half 
and over two-thirds of BITs selecting ICSID as a third-party institution is 
respectively 52 and 31, accounting for 78.78% (52/66) and 46.96% (31/66) 
of all 66 countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above high percentages show that the B&R countries prefer ICSID 
as an option for third-party institutions in their BITs, which implies that there 
is a high probability that IIDs arising out of the relevant BITs will be handled 
by ICSID. 
2. Selection of Other Third-Party Institutions 
It has also been found that, in addition to ICSID, a few other third-party 
institutions have been selected. For example, the BITs between Kazakhstan 
and Turkey, Indonesia and Cuba, Uzbekistan and Austria, and Lebanon and 
South Korea chose the International Chamber of Commerce International 
Court of Arbitration (ICC) as a third-party institution; the BITs between 
Philippines and Russia, India and Cyprus, and Sri Lanka and Egypt chose the 
Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC); the 
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BIT between Indonesia and Egypt chose the Cairo Regional Center for 
International Commercial Arbitration; and the BIT between Sri Lanka and 
Egypt chose the Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration.14 
However, the frequency of selecting ICC and SCC in BITs is much 
lower than selecting ICSID, and the selection of other third-party institutions 
is even more rare.15 Thus, it can be said that the probability of B&R-country-
related IIDs being handled by the ICSID is the highest, and it is likely the 
ICSID will have the most impact on the IIDs settlement in the Belt and Road 
area as well. 
B. Status of the B&R Countries being Sued in ICSID and Their Nationals’ 
Participation in Dealing with ICSID Cases 
ICSID released The ICSID Caseload Statistics (Issue 2017) in 2017.16 
This report provided authoritative statistics on the cases registered in ICSID 
and the personnel involved in handling ICSID cases by December 31, 2016. 
By December 31, 2016, a total of 597 cases had been filed with the 
ICSID under the ICSID Convention and Additional Facility Rules (AFR). 
Among them, there were 534 (89.5%) ICSID Convention Arbitration Cases, 
8 (1.3%) ICSID Convention Conciliation Cases, 53 (8.9%) ICSID AFR 
Arbitration Cases, and 2 (0.3%) ICSID AFR Conciliation Cases.17 
                                                                                                                           
 
14 Wolters Kluwer, Treaty Database, www.kluwerarbitration.com (last visited June 12, 2017). 
15 This conclusion is not only tenable in the BITs signed by B&R countries and examined by this 
Article, but also evidenced by the quantity of IIDs accepted by various institutions and counted by 
UNIDAID. See Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, INV. POL’Y HUB, http://investmentpolicyhub 
.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByRulesAndInstitution (last visited June 12, 2017). 
16 See ICSID, THE ICSID CASELOAD STATISTICS (2017), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/ 
Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-1%20(English)%20Final.pdf. 
17 Id. at 8. 
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Type of Cases Registered under the ICSID Convention and AFR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chart is copied from The ICSID Caseload—Statistics 
(Issue 2017-1) p. 8. 
The geographic distribution of all ICSID cases involving the state party 
was: Eastern Europe & Central Asia 25%, South America 24%, Sub-Saharan 
Africa 15%, Middle East and North Africa 10%, South and East Asia and the 
Pacific 8%, Western Europe 7%, Central America and the Caribbean 6%, and 
North America (Canada, Mexico & United States) 5%.18 
                                                                                                                           
 
18 Id. at 11. 
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Geographic Distribution of All Cases Registered under the ICSID 
Convention and AFR, by State Party Involved 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The chart is copied from The ICSID Caseload—Statistics 
(Issue 2017-1) p. 11. 
The geographic distribution of arbitrators, conciliators and ad hoc 
committee members appointed in ICSID cases was: Western Europe 47%, 
North America (Canada, Mexico & United States) 21%, South & East Asia 
and the Pacific 11%, South America 11%, Middle East and North Africa 4%, 
Central America and the Caribbean 2%, Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
2%, and Sub-Saharan Africa 2%.19 
                                                                                                                           
 
19 Id. at 19. 
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Arbitrators, Conciliators and ad hoc Committee Members Appointed in 
Cases Registered under the ICSID Convention and AFR—Distribution of 
Appointments by Geographic Region 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chart is copied from The ICSID Caseload—Statistics 
(Issue 2017-1) p. 19. 
According to the geographical classification criteria of The ICSID 
Caseload Statistics (Issue 2017), the regions covered or radiated by the Belt 
and Road principally include South and East Asia and the Pacific, Middle 
East and North Africa, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. In these regions, 
the distribution of cases involving state parties reached 43% in total, but the 
distribution of arbitrators, conciliators and ad hoc committee members was 
only 17% altogether. 
The above data show that, under the ICSID IIDs settlement mechanism, 
the proportion of B&R countries being sued is relatively high, while the 
proportion of B&R countries’ nationals participating in adjudicating cases is 
relatively low. In other words, since the B&R countries frequently chose 
ICSID as the third-party institution, the IIDs with a B&R country as the 
respondent are handled more by nationals of countries in other regions 
(especially developed North America and Western Europe). 
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II. NECESSITY AND FEASIBILITY OF ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BELT AND 
ROAD IIDS SETTLEMENT INSTITUTION 
Any institution innovation or organization establishment should first 
evaluate the necessity and feasibility. For the creation of the B&R IIDs 
Settlement Institution, there has to be a solid foundation of necessity and 
feasibility. 
A. Necessity of the Establishment of Belt and Road IIDs Settlement 
Institution 
1. A Need for Optimizing the Current Situation of IIDs Settlement by 
Third-Party Institutions 
As international investment becomes increasingly active in the 21st 
century and the number of international investment treaties increases 
constantly, the number of IIDs filed with third-party institutions rises 
steadily.20 While third-party institutions have, to a certain extent, helped 
promote IIDs settlement and maintained international investment order, they 
also receive a lot of criticism. For example, the main criticisms regarding 
International Investment Arbitration include: arbitral tribunals usually 
interpret investment treaty provisions in favor of investors; arbitral tribunals 
make different interpretations on the same treaty provisions which result in a 
lack of consistency and predictability of the awards; arbitral proceedings lack 
transparency; arbitrators lack independence and neutrality; and arbitrators 
have formed some “elite” group.21 Particularly, some arbitral tribunals put 
too much emphasis on the protection of investors, which leads to an 
imbalance between the interests of investors and host countries; therefore 
                                                                                                                           
 
20 The number of known investor-state dispute settlement cases per year has risen from 17 in 2001 
to 62 in 2016. Given the confidentiality of some investment arbitration cases under certain circumstances, 
the actual amount should be higher. In the meantime, although the annual acceptance of the case 
fluctuated, the overall growing trend was quite obvious. See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE 
AND DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2017: INVESTMENT AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 114–15 
(2017), https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2017_en.pdf. 
21 See Gloria Maria Alvarez et al., A Response to the Criticism Against ISDS by EFILA, 33 J. INT’L 
ARB. 1, 2–36 (2016). 
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aggravating the conflicts between them.22 Because international investment 
arbitration is more commonly raised by investors from developed countries 
against developing host countries, the above-mentioned problems have also 
been reasons why many developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America withdrew from the current international investment legal system.23 
It is generally considered that a need exists for improvement of the 
present IIDs settlement mechanism, although there are many negative views 
toward the above criticism.24 For example, one scholar suggested that an 
Investment Arbitration Appellate Court should be created and authorized to 
review all awards granted under international investment treaties.25 
Nonetheless, any revolution for a long-running dispute settlement 
mechanism will face instinctive rejection due to the long-standing 
dependence and custom. Furthermore, the changes of IIDs settlement 
mechanism require revisions of existing treaties, which will multiply the 
difficulty in enforcing the reform.26 Therefore, having the historic 
opportunity of the Belt and Road Initiative, it would be more realistic and 
feasible to achieve the goal of optimizing the regional IIDs settlement 
mechanism through the establishment of the B&R IIDs Settlement 
Institution. 
2. A Need for the Settlement of IIDs in the Belt and Road Region 
It is foreseeable that the fast increase of global FDIs27 and the 
implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative will boost enormous growth 
                                                                                                                           
 
22 See Jinsong Yu, Study on the Balance of Rights and Interests Protection Between Investors and 
Host States in International Investment Treaty Arbitrations, 2011 CHINA LEGAL SCI. 132, 132 (No. 2). 
23 See Ruiping Deng & Yaguang Zhou, Game and Coordination: China’s Strategy for the 
Construction of Multilateral Investment Rules, 2015 MOD. L. SCI. 159, 162 (No. 5). 
24 Alvarez et al., supra note 21, at 2–36. 
25 See Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public 
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1617–25 (2005). 
26 See, e.g., The ICSID Convention can only be amended after all States Parties have ratified, 
accepted, or approved the amendments, thus it is not hard to understand that the Convention has not been 
amended so far. ICSID SECRETARIAT, POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS OF THE FRAMEWORK FOR ICSID 
ARBITRATION 2, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/Possible%20Improvements%20of 
%20the%20Framework%20of%20ICSID%20Arbitration.pdf. 
27 The global FDIs flows reached 1.76 trillion U.S. dollars in 2015, increase by 38% over 2014. See 
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2016: INVESTOR 
NATIONALITY: POLICY CHALLENGES 2 (2016). Although the global FDIs flows in 2016 was US $1.75 
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of FDIs in the B&R region. The consequent growth of IIDs will certainly 
produce demands for IIDs settlement in this region. Properly resolving these 
disputes is of great significance to the smooth implementation and steady 
development of the Belt and Road Initiative. Though the existing 
international institutions like ICSID and ICC, as well as national institutions 
like SCC, can function to a certain extent, their advantages in both 
geographical convenience and psychological acceptance of regional users are 
weaker than a specialized IIDs Settlement Institution within the B&R area. 
Thus, built on the quality of disputes settlement, a professional institution 
located in the B&R region and committed to the settlement of intra-regional 
IIDs can better realize the aim of properly resolving the fast-growing IIDs in 
the B&R region. 
3. A Need for Protecting Geographical Investments in the Belt and 
Road Region 
As one of the Chinese initiatives to promote international economic 
cooperation and development based on Asia-Europe geography,28 the 
construction of a Belt and Road Initiative should also be consistent with the 
purpose of geographic investment protections. This purpose should not only 
emphasize the promotion and protection of international investments in this 
region, but also take into consideration the geographical features that B&R 
countries are mainly developing countries to balance their demands for the 
right of development29 as far as possible. However, the global IID settlement 
mechanism represented by ICSID, due to its global perspective, usually 
ignores the specificity of geopolitical investment protections determined by 
                                                                                                                           
 
trillion, a slight decrease from 2015, the absolute value is still huge. See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE 
ON TRADE AND DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2017: INVESTMENT AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 2 
(2017), https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2017_en.pdf. 
28 See Deng & Zhou, supra note 23. 
29 The United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development Art. 1, paragraph 1 stipulates: “The 
right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples 
are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, 
in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.” G.A. Res. 41/128(I) ¶ 1 
(Dec. 4, 1986). Art. 4, paragraph 2 stipulates: “Sustained action is required to promote more rapid 
development of developing countries. As a complement to the efforts of developing countries, effective 
international co-operation is essential in providing these countries with appropriate means and facilities 
to foster their comprehensive development.” G.A. Res. 41/128(IV) ¶ 2 (Dec. 4, 1986). 
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the characteristics of development in different regions. For example, because 
ICSID generally favors the protection of investors’ interests, it neglects the 
public interests of host countries, and undermines developing countries’ right 
of development,30 causing some developing countries’ dissatisfaction and 
even a desire to withdraw from it.31 Additionally, in third-party institutions 
outside the B&R area, the authority of designating dispute resolution 
personnel is often vested in nationals of extra-regional countries.32 
Regardless of their subjective national standpoint or their objective cultural 
structure and growing environment, it is questionable whether they can fully 
understand the need for geographic investment protections in the B&R region 
when they designate the relevant dispute settlement personnel. Therefore, 
                                                                                                                           
 
30 Deng & Zhou, supra note 23, at 161. 
31 E.g., Venezuela submitted a notice of denunciation of the ICSID Convention pursuant to Art. 71 
of the convention in 2012. See Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, Venezuela Submits a Notice under 
Article 71 of the ICSID Convention, ICSID (Jan. 26, 2012), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/News 
.aspx?CID=47. 
32 Take the authority for arbitrator’s appointment under the ICSID mechanism as an example. Art. 
5 of the ICSID Convention stipulates: 
The President of the Bank shall be ex officio Chairman of the Administrative Council 
(hereinafter called the Chairman) but shall have no vote. During his absence or inability to 
act and during any vacancy in the office of President of the Bank, the person for the time 
being acting as President shall act as Chairman of the Administrative Council. 
ICSID, Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other 
States, Art. V, Oct. 14, 1966. Art. 38 stipulates: 
If the Tribunal shall not have been constituted within 90 days after notice of registration of 
the request has been dispatched by the Secretary-General in accordance with paragraph (3) 
of Article 36, or such other period as the parties may agree, the Chairman shall, at the request 
of either party and after consulting both parties as far as possible, appoint the arbitrator or 
arbitrators not yet appointed. Arbitrators appointed by the Chairman pursuant to this Article 
shall not be nationals of the Contracting State party to the dispute or of the Contracting State 
whose national is a party to the dispute. 
ICSID, Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other 
States, Art. XXXVI, Oct. 14, 1966. Under such arrangements, the arbitrator’s appointments are exercised 
by the President of the ICSID Administrative Council, who is also the President of the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, when either party does not appoint an arbitrator or both parties fail 
to appoint the chief arbitrator by consensus. In practice, however, the possibility of the consensual 
appointment of the chief arbitrator who has a decisive influence on the case, by negotiation between both 
parties after the dispute, is very low. Therefore, the chairman has great powers in determining the chief 
arbitrator. This leads to the possibility for the chairman to designate, if necessary, the chief arbitrator who 
holds same or similar position to him or her, so as to affect the final outcome of the award. On the other 
hand, all IBRD presidents previous and present (who are also the Chairman) are all American nationals. 
See Past Presidents, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/archives/history/past-presidents 
(last visited June 12, 2017). This makes the authority for the arbitrator’s appointment to actually be vested 
in the hands of U.S. nationals. 
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there is indeed a need to establish the B&R IIDs Settlement Institution for 
geographical investment protections and, through it, to create an IIDs 
Settlement Mechanism in line with the B&R geographical features. 
iv. A Need for China to Participate in and Further Guide the 
Reconstruction of International Investment Regulations 
Currently, the readjustment and diversion of economic and trade 
strategies of Europe and the United States, as well as the emerging new 
generation of international trade and economic rules, not only make China 
face a more complicated international environment to promote trade and 
investment, but also provide China a good opportunity to exert influence in 
global economic governance.33 In the implementation of the Belt and Road 
Initiative, China, as an advocate and major force, should play a guiding role 
in reconstructing regional investment regulations, including rules on IIDs 
settlement. Facing the reality that B&R countries frequently select ICSID as 
a third-party institution while ICSID more often appoints non-B&R-regional 
personnel (represented by nationals of North American and Western 
European states) to deal with IIDs, China should facilitate the establishment 
of B&R IIDs Settlement Institution and construct relevant rules for IIDs 
settlement through it. This accords with the need for Chinese participation 
and guidance in reconstructing international investment rules. 
B. Feasibility of the Establishment of the Belt and Road IIDs Settlement 
Institution 
i. Feasibility in Law 
The sources of legitimacy for the IIDs settlement institution’s 
establishment include domestic law and international law. National 
institutions are those created under national laws while international 
institutions are those created under international laws.34 Resolving IIDs 
relates to sovereign states’ abandonment of their relevant institutions’ 
                                                                                                                           
 
33 See Jingxia Shi, The Reconstruction of Investment Rules in International Trade and the Chinese 
Response, 2015 SOC. SCI. CHINA, 128, 140 (No. 9). 
34 See RUIPING DENG ET AL., LEGAL SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 133 
(2010). 
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jurisdictional immunity. Thus, except for a very few historic and prestigious 
national institutions (such as SCC), it is hard for national institutions to obtain 
universal trust from states to waive their jurisdictional immunity (no national 
institutions have the universal trust in the B&R region currently). Therefore, 
the establishment of the B&R IIDs Settlement Institution should be based on 
international law, which means the B&R countries should conclude an 
international treaty for the purpose of establishing the B&R IIDs Settlement 
Institution (hereinafter “the B&R IIDs Settlement Convention”) to achieve 
this goal.35 Obviously, this is fully feasible in theory. But the difficulty lies 
in the willingness of the B&R countries to conclude such convention, that is, 
whether it is realistically feasible. To this question, the Article provides a 
positive answer: First, due to the impact of economic globalization and the 
stagnation of multilateral negotiations represented by the Doha round, many 
countries have shifted their interest in regional economic and trade 
agreements.36 The conclusion of such Convention by the B&R countries 
confirms to the above tendency. Second, as many developing countries are 
dissatisfied with, and in some cases even exiting, the present IIDs settlement 
mechanism represented by ICSID, building a new convention to create the 
B&R IIDs Settlement Institution has become a necessity. Moreover, as 
evidenced by B&R countries’ participation and support in the Belt and Road 
Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), China is very 
influential in this region. It is highly probable to gain support if China 
promotes the process. 
ii. Feasibility in Platform 
It is a matter of choice whether we should establish the B&R IIDs 
Settlement Institution on an existing organization’s platform or establish it 
by building a new platform. Throughout the process of creating and 
developing ICSID, the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) has played an important role in its formation,37 
                                                                                                                           
 
35 ICSID Convention Art. 1, paragraph 1 stipulates: “There is hereby established the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (hereinafter called the Centre).” (Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, Oct. 14, 1966). It can 
be seen that the creation of ICSID is also realized by the conclusion of ICSID Convention. 
36 See Shi, supra note 33. 
37 See ICSID, History of the ICSID Convention (Volume I), ICSID PUB. 2, 2–11 (1970). 
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operation,38 and the settlement of disputes and the voluntary performance of 
awards.39 The better choice is to rely on an existing platform to create the 
B&R IIDs Settlement Institution. The AIIB, which was formally established 
on December 25, 2015, is undoubtedly the best choice among existing 
platforms. Therefore, AIIB has provided the most feasible platform for 
establishing the B&R IIDs Settlement Institution. 
iii. Feasibility in Resources 
In addition to feasibility in law and platform, establishing the B&R IIDs 
Settlement Institution cannot go without the feasibility in various resources, 
such as funds, human resources and case resources. Funds will meet the 
requirements for its creation and operation, in the form of the member 
countries’ subscription, AIIB’s initial support or loan, and the subsequent 
income after establishment. Regarding human resources, the hardest issue is 
the employment of proper dispute resolution personnel. However, in general, 
this difficulty is surmountable. There are not only some persons engaged in 
IIDs settlement in ICSID and other third-party institutions, but also many 
people dedicated to commercial disputes settlement in the B&R region. 
Provided they have or will gradually develop appropriate knowledge and 
practical experiences, they may become candidates to work for the B&R IIDs 
Settlement Institution. Furthermore, selecting a certain percentage of dispute 
settlement personnel from outside the B&R area is also an option. Regarding 
case resources, the growth of IIDs brought by the Belt and Road Initiative 
can provide cases for this Institution. To sum up, it is also feasible to establish 
the B&R IIDs Settlement Institution in the aspects of various resources. 
                                                                                                                           
 
38 E.g., according to ICSID Convention, the seat of the Centre shall be at the principal office of the 
IBRD (Art. 2), the President of the Bank shall be ex officio Chairman of the Administrative Council (Art. 
5). (ICSID, Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other 
States, Oct. 14, 1966.) Many other aspects such as the functioning of the ICSID (like the nomination of 
the Secretary-General and any Deputy Secretary-General) and the operational level of dispute settlement 
(like the appointment of arbitrators) are authorized to the Chairman (Arts. 10 and 38). 
39 See generally REED ET AL., supra note 10, at 17. 
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III. SPECIFIC PATHS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BELT AND ROAD IIDS 
SETTLEMENT INSTITUTION 
The key to establishing the B&R IIDs Settlement Institution lies in the 
formulation and conclusion of the B&R IIDs Settlement Convention. Given 
that ICSID is a successful example of the similar institution in the current 
international community, it is wise to learn from and refer to the ICSID 
Convention. 
A. The Formulation of the B&R IIDs Settlement Convention 
1. The Formulating Process of the B&R IIDs Settlement 
Convention 
The creation convention of ICSID, which is one of the World Bank 
Group’s five major organizations,40 cannot be formulated without the 
positive promotion of IBRD, another organization of the World Bank Group. 
Its drafting and negotiating had been lasting for five years, from Mr. Eugene 
R. Black, the then President of the World Bank Group, formally proposed 
the idea of ICSID Convention in his address to the Annual Meeting of the 
Board of Governors of the Bank in Vienna in September 1961 to the 
twentieth ratification of the Convention being delivered to the Bank, 
triggering the convention to be effective in September 1966.41 The 
formulation of the ICSID Convention benefited not only from the global 
                                                                                                                           
 
40 About the World Bank, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/about (last visited June 12, 
2017) (naming the five organizations of the World Bank Group to be the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)). 
41 See ICSID, History of the ICSID Convention (Volume I), supra note 37, at 2–11. 
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expectations of establishing an IIDs settlement institution to boost 
international investments,42 but also from the platform and efforts of IBRD.43 
In the B&R region, because of the growth of regional IIDs and the 
negative impact arising from the high-frequency selection of ICSID or other 
extra-regional third-party institutions, B&R countries have the expectations 
to create the B&R IIDs Settlement Institution for promoting regional FDIs. 
The establishment of the AIIB has also provided a platform for drafting and 
consulting opinions about the relevant convention. Therefore, it can be said 
that, like the formulation of ICSID Convention, driving the formulation of 
the B&R IIDs Settlement Convention has been well prepared. The only thing 
needed now is an “east wind,” that is, “a formal proposal for formulating this 
convention.” Thus, as the advocate and momentum of the Belt and Road 
Initiative, China may take the lead in submitting relevant proposals to the 
president of the AIIB, so that the president can ask for discussions in the 
board of governors.44 If agreed to by the board of governors, the work of 
drafting, reviewing, amending and finalizing the convention may be carried 
                                                                                                                           
 
42 On August 28, 1961, a paper transmitted to the Bank’s Administrative Council by Aron Broches, 
IBRD general counsel, said: 
The many studies which have been undertaken in recent years concerning ways and means 
to promote private foreign investment have almost invariably discussed the problem of the 
settlement of disputes between foreign private investors or entrepreneurs and the 
Government of the country where the investment is made. In many cases these studies have 
recommended the establishment of international arbitration and/or conciliation machinery. 
See ICSID, History of the ICSID Convention (Volume II-1), ICSID PUB. 1 (1968). Mr. Eugene R. Black 
accepted the comments made by Mr. Aron Broches and formally proposed the idea of formulating the 
ICSID Convention at the subsequent Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of the Bank in Vienna. 
See ICSID, History of the ICSID Convention (Volume I), supra note 37, at 4. So, at that time, the 
international community’s desire to create an IIDs settlement institution to promote international 
investment was an important reason for the IBRD to formulate the ICSID convention. 
43 IBRD has done a great deal of work in the formulation of the ICSID Convention, including but 
not limited to: proposing the idea of the convention and submitting it to the Board of Governors for 
discussion, drafting the articles of the Convention and parsing them one by one, organizing the bank’s 
member countries to comment on the articles of the Convention and amending the draft according to their 
comments many times, and opening the convention for signature by member states. See ICSID, History 
of the ICSID Convention (Volume II-1), supra note 42. Thus, another important reason for the successful 
formulation of the convention is the platform and the efforts made by IBRD. 
44 According to Art. 22 of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Articles of Agreement, each 
member shall be represented on the Board of Governors and shall appoint one Governor and one Alternate 
Governor. So, the Board of Governors is constituted by representatives of member states. See ASIAN 
INFRASTRUCTURE INV. BANK, ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT 13 (n.d.), https://www.aiib.org/en/about-
aiib/basic-documents/_download/articles-of-agreement/basic_document_english-bank_articles_of_ 
agreement.pdf. 
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out gradually and in a series, pursuant to the constitution and related rules of 
the AIIB. 
2. Innovations of the Structure and Systems of the B&R IIDs 
Settlement Convention 
It is important to focus on what structure and systems should be adopted 
for the B&R IIDs Settlement Convention. It relates to whether the convention 
will obtain broad support and whether the new B&R IIDs Settlement 
Institution will achieve its due value. In this regard, it will be more productive 
by making beneficial innovations based on the existing structure and systems 
of the ICSID Convention. 
a. Innovations of the Structure 
From the structural point of view, besides the preamble and regular 
matters of treaties such as signing, entry into force, amendment, exiting, 
dispute resolution provisions, etc., the structure of the ICSID Convention can 
be summarized into three main parts: (1) institution creation and 
organizational authorities; (2) conciliation procedures; (3) arbitration 
procedures. Part (1) stipulates the legal ground for the creation of ICSID and 
its organizational structure and administrative authorities; part (2) stipulates 
the procedures for ICSID to conduct IIDs conciliation; and part (3) stipulates 
the procedures for ICSID to conduct IIDs arbitration.45 
Provisions with respect to the institution creation and organizational 
authorities, as the “Organization Act” of the B&R IIDs Settlement Institution 
providing the legal basis for the establishment and management of this 
institution, are indispensable in the B&R IIDs Settlement Convention. 
Conciliation and arbitration, as the two main methods of dispute settlement, 
should also be undoubtedly stipulated in the convention. What needs to be 
considered is whether, apart from conciliation and arbitration, other third-
party IIDs settlement methods can be incorporated to make it more 
diversified. For example, can the Fact-Finding procedures stipulated in the 
                                                                                                                           
 
45 Part (1) mainly involves the provisions of Chapter 1 of the ICSID Convention; Part (2) mainly 
involves the provisions of Chapter 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 of the ICSID Convention; Part (3) mainly involves the 
provisions of Chapter 2, 4, 5, 6, 7. 
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ICSID AFR46 also be adopted by the B&R IIDs Settlement Convention? Is it 
also possible to adopt the pure case registration and pure dispute resolution 
personnel designation services which have been widely practiced already? 
Due to the limitations of the types of dispute settlement methods and the 
lack of relevant knowledge and practices at those days, the ICSID 
Convention only adopted the conciliation and arbitration. However, since the 
kinds of dispute settlement methods have increased, and some new methods 
for dispute settlement have been applied successfully, we should keep pace 
with the times and absorb new beneficial forms of dispute settlement when 
we design the provisions of the B&R IIDs Settlement Convention, so as to 
take the full advantage of diversity. Therefore, in terms of structural design, 
the B&R IIDs Settlement Convention may supplement a new part of “other 
methods for dispute settlement” compared to the ICSID Convention, 
including provisions on fact-finding, pure case registration and pure dispute 
resolution personnel designation services. 
b. Innovations of the Systems 
After functioning for more than half a century, the ICSID has exposed 
some drawbacks though it plays an important and active role in the settlement 
of IIDs. It attempted to self-improve by amending conciliation or arbitration 
rules,47 but institutional deficiencies in the ICSID convention can hardly be 
changed. Therefore, the B&R IIDs Settlement Convention should take full 
account of institutional innovations while it continuously follows some parts 
of the ICSID Convention. Such institutional innovations should confirm the 
                                                                                                                           
 
46 The Administrative Council of the Centre has adopted AFR authorizing the Secretariat of ICSID 
to administer certain categories of proceedings between States and nationals of other States that fall 
outside the scope of the ICSID Convention. The AFR applies to the following disputes: (1) conciliation 
and arbitration proceedings for the settlement of legal disputes arising directly out of an investment which 
are not within the jurisdiction of the Centre because either the State party to the dispute or the State whose 
national is a party to the dispute is not a Contracting State; (b) conciliation and arbitration proceedings for 
the settlement of legal disputes which are not within the jurisdiction of the Centre because they do not 
arise directly out of an investment, provided that either the State party to the dispute or the State whose 
national is a party to the dispute is a Contracting State; and (c) fact-finding proceedings. See Int’l Ctr. For 
Settlement of Inv. Disputes, Additional Facility Rules: Introduction and Art. 2 (Apr. 10, 2006), 
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/icsid/StaticFiles/facility/iii.htm. 
47 See ICSID SECRETARIAT, SUGGESTED CHANGES TO THE ICSID RULES AND REGULATIONS 
(2005), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/Possible%20Improvements%20of%20the% 
20Framework%20of%20ICSID%20Arbitration.pdf. 
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essential objectives of promoting international investment developments in 
the B&R region and facilitating a just and reasonable settlement of intra-
regional IIDs. Meanwhile, such institutional innovations should also take 
account of the geographical features that B&R states are mainly developing 
countries. 
Firstly, institutional innovations for promoting international investment 
developments in the B&R region. The establishment of the B&R IIDs 
Settlement Institution must initially coincide with the overall circumstances 
surrounding the Belt and Road Initiative. Promoting the developments of 
intra-regional FDIs is naturally a basic objective. By stipulating in the treaty 
that a dispute can be submitted to international arbitration, the host 
governments’ action standards for foreign investments under the treaty will 
become clearer.48 Hence, it can be said that the mechanism of dispute 
settlement by third-party institutions itself plays a positive role in facilitating 
FDIs. Of course, it is still necessary to adopt systems that are more beneficial 
to investment promotion. Such systems should make it easier for investors to 
seek IID settlements from third-party institutions. For example, according to 
Article 25, paragraph 1 of the ICSID Convention, even though both the host 
country and the investor’s home country are parties to the convention, ICSID 
does not have jurisdiction in the absence of a written consent between the 
host state and the investor to submit their disputes for settlement. The ICSID 
Convention’s restriction on its jurisdiction has specific historical reasons: at 
the time that dispute settlement between sovereign states and private 
investors provided by third-party institutions had not been universally 
accepted, such restriction could avoid the dystocia or premature-death of the 
ICSID caused by not giving the countries a right to agree separately.49 
However, given that settlements of IIDs provided by third-party institutions 
have been widely recognized all over the world today and have been actually 
                                                                                                                           
 
48 See DOAK R. BISHOP ET AL., FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES: CASES MATERIALS AND 
COMMENTARY 1 (2d ed. 2014). 
49 This conclusion can be perceived from the conservative attitude of the IBRD when formulating 
the ICSID Convention. For example, the ICSID Convention very carefully excludes any provisions 
relating to the substantive obligations of the host state and investor and any specific law on which the 
substantive decision is based. Some scholar thought that bank did so in order to avoid any discussion 
meeting becoming “a diplomatic conference or even a world-wide preparatory conference” and “they did 
not want this effort to replicate the experience of the United Nations” on the dispute settlement mechanism 
for investment. The subaudition is that if the attitude is radical, the convention will be difficult to get 
through. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The ICSID Convention: Origins and Transformation, 38 GA. J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 47, 51–52 (2009). 
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introduced by several regional treaties such as the Energy Charter Treaty and 
the North American Free Trade Agreement, the jurisdiction system in the 
B&R IIDs Settlement Convention may consider a waiver of further written 
consent by host states and investors. The conclusion of the Convention means 
consent to its jurisdiction. On the one hand, by doing this countries that are 
open to the Convention can be exempt from the cumbersome signing of BITs 
or MITs separately, which will simplify the procedures for investors seeking 
settlement of disputes. On the other hand, the obligations of countries that 
are conservative to the Convention do not increase because they can either 
exercise their right of reservation under the Convention or refuse to sign the 
Convention to exclude its jurisdiction (the actual effect is the same as the 
lack of written consent after the conclusion). In addition, the B&R IIDs 
Settlement Convention may also bring such scenario into its jurisdiction that 
at least one of the host states and the investor’s home state is not a signatory 
party, but the host state and the investor have agreed in writing to submit 
their disputes to the B&R IIDs Settlement Institution (regardless of it being 
agreed by contracts between the host state and the investor or by other treaties 
between the host state and the investor’s home state). Its theoretical basis is 
that party autonomy should reasonably be one of the sources for jurisdiction. 
The existing practice is that ICSID has long provided conciliation and 
arbitration services to similar parties under its AFR.50 
Secondly, institutional innovations for facilitating a just and reasonable 
settlement of intra-regional IIDs. Resolving disputes justly and reasonably is 
a fundamental goal for all dispute settlement institutions and is undoubtedly 
a principle which should be upheld when formulating the B&R IIDs 
Settlement Convention. To realize this goal, balancing the interests of both 
parties as far as possible within the boundary permitted by laws and rules in 
addition to managing procedures and judging substantial issues pursuant to 
appropriate laws or rules, is of the utmost importance. This depends not only 
on the dispute resolution personnel’s superb legal application skill and 
sophisticated interest trade-off technique, but also on the institutional 
guarantees of the Convention. It is undeniable that the ICSID Convention 
had also made great efforts to pursue this goal. However, as circumstances 
changed over time, some measures, which are favorable to a just and 
                                                                                                                           
 
50 See INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, ADDITIONAL FACILITY RULES 10–11 
(2006), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/icsiddocs/AFR_English-final.pdf. 
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reasonable settlement under historical conditions at that time, have now had 
space for improvements. In this regard, the B&R IIDs Settlement Convention 
should, by virtue of its backward advantages, innovate systems that can better 
achieve the goal of just and reasonable disputes settlement. For example, the 
transparency of IIDs arbitration proceedings, which have drawn much 
attention in recent years. Enhancing transparency requires the publicity of 
awards and plea materials and certain procedural entitlements to non-parties 
(such as Amicus Curiae).51 In other words, enhancing the intensity of external 
supervisions is helpful to promote just and reasonable dispute settlements. 
The question is how to treat “confidentiality,” the traditional feature of 
arbitration. Article 48, paragraph 5 of the ICSID Convention provides that 
“The Centre shall not publish the award without the consent of the parties.” 
This is essentially a confidentiality requirement for the awards, that is, 
awards shall not be public, but may, as an exception be public after mutual 
consent. However, as international investment arbitration is involved with 
public interests of the host state and thus has a public nature, the transparency 
should be given more attention than confidentiality.52 This is also 
demonstrated by the practices of ICSID.53 Therefore, the system about the 
publicity of awards in the B&R IIDs Settlement Convention may make 
awards public as a principle and not public after either party’s explicit 
objection as an exception. It may stipulate, “the award should be published 
unless either party raises an objection in writing” to increase its transparency, 
broaden the channels of supervisions, and be more conducive to realizing 
fairness and rationality. 
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Thirdly, institutional innovations taking account of the geographical 
feature that B&R states are primarily developing countries. The B&R 
countries are primarily developing countries. They not only desire to attract 
FDIs but also fear that their right to development will be harmed by the 
dispute settlement. This characteristic is inherently contradictory because 
attracting investments requires putting the focus of protection on the 
investor’s side while safeguarding the right to development requires the focus 
on the host country’s side. Regarding such contradiction, this Article argues 
that creating a system to best balance both is a good option. For example, 
many developing countries complain that ICSID tribunals tend to make 
awards in favor of investors, and ever since awards are made, they are final 
and enforceable. Thus, if an appeal mechanism can be set up to provide a 
relief approach for the lost host state, it will balance the host state’s rights 
and interests. This has been considered by the ICSID secretariat. 
Nevertheless, due to Article 53, paragraph 1 of the ICSID Convention, it is 
nearly impossible to create an appeal mechanism because it requires 
revisions of the Convention.54 In contrast, the geographical characteristic that 
B&R states are primarily developing countries has provided suitable context 
for setting up an IIDs appeal mechanism. Therefore, it is not impossible to 
create this mechanism in the B&R IIDs Settlement Convention. 
B. The Conclusion of the B&R IIDs Settlement Convention 
The conclusion of a treaty will not be accomplished in a single step and 
will face a long process of compromise and gaming. It is predictable that 
different countries, based on their respective positions, have different 
attitudes toward the conclusion of the B&R IIDs Settlement Convention and 
the establishment of the B&R IIDs Settlement Institution. These attitudes 
mainly include: (1) whether to agree for submitting IIDs to third-party 
institutions for settlement; (2) whether to agree for submitting IIDs to the 
new B&R IIDs Settlement Institution for settlement; and (3) whether to be 
willing to accept the concrete systems of the B&R IIDs Settlement 
Convention. 
Considering item (1), we can see from the empirical findings in the 
preceding part of this Article that there are very few B&R states that 
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completely reject third-party institutions. Thus, this does not constitute a real 
problem. As far as items (2) and (3) are concerned, this Article is also 
optimistic. Because the insurmountable drawbacks of the wide selection of 
the ICSID mechanism by the B&R countries have been criticized by many 
developing countries, the new B&R IIDs Settlement Institution will provide 
these countries with new options and will demonstrate its natural attractions 
from its geographical advantages brought by its location in the B&R area and 
from its professional advantages brought by its commitment in resolving 
B&R IIDs. On the other hand, as one of the most important powers in the 
Belt and Road region, China has a considerable influence, which will 
facilitate the conclusion of the Convention. Of course, appropriately solving 
the above issues is not an easy task which will require continuous 
negotiations and comprehensive considerations of the Convention among 
B&R countries. However, signing a treaty always needs superb wisdom and 
sufficient patience, so it is normal to have a hard process. We can reduce the 
resistances and increase the probability of success if we push the process 
forward by starting from states in the same or similar standpoint and gain 
enough contracting parties to make the convention go into effect. The next 
step will be to persuade other countries to join gradually. 
CONCLUSION 
In the context of the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative, 
there will be a large increase of IIDs in the region. Taking full advantage of 
disputes settlement by third-party institutions and handling the ever-growing 
IIDs properly are of great significance to the smooth implementation and 
steady development of the Belt and Road Initiative. 
Currently, the common decisions of the ICSID to be an IIDs settlement 
institution in BITs signed by B&R states will result in a relatively large 
proportion of cases involving the B&R countries to be handled by ICSID, as 
well as a relatively small proportion of dispute resolution personnel in ICSID 
cases to be nationals of B&R states. This means that under the present 
situation of frequent selection of ICSID as a third-party institution, IIDs with 
B&R states as respondents are more dealt with by nationals of countries in 
other regions, especially the developed Western Europe and North America. 
Therefore, from the perspectives of optimizing the status quo of IIDs 
settlement provided by third-party institutions, coping with the ever-growing 
IIDs in the B&R region, establishing a dispute settlement mechanism 
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conducive to geographical investment protections, and from the perspective 
that China should participate and further even guide the reconstruction of 
international investment regulations, it is fully necessary to establish the 
B&R IIDs Settlement Institution. By concluding a convention to provide 
legal basis, making AIIB a platform, and solving issues of fund, human and 
case resources gradually, it is also sufficiently feasible in law for the platform 
and resources to establish this institution. 
With respect to the specific paths, we should use the platform of the 
AIIB to facilitate the formulation of the B&R IIDs Settlement Convention. 
China may play a proactive role in this process. Moreover, based on the 
ICSID Convention, the B&R IIDs Settlement Convention should, on the one 
hand, innovate the structure by adopting new dispute settlement methods to 
make a good use of its advantages in diversity. On the other hand, it should 
innovate the systems which are conducive to promoting the developments of 
B&R regional international investments and to facilitating a just and 
reasonable settlement of regional IIDs. These systems should also take 
account of the geographical feature that the B&R states are primarily 
developing countries. In the process of concluding the Convention, we 
should anticipate both positive results and difficult processes, and invest with 
great wisdom and patience. In order to reduce resistances and increase the 
probability of success, we should push the process forward by starting from 
countries in the same or similar standpoint and gain enough contracting 
parties to make the convention go into effect, then mobilize other countries 
to join gradually. 
